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1 I ntr oduction
ONE OF THE PARADIGMATIC FEATURES o f in ﬂ e xib le b u s in e s s m a n a g e m e n t a n d c o n s e r -
va t ive c o r p o r a t e c u lt u r e is t h e c h a r a c t e r is t ic r e lu c t a n c e t o a d ju s t t h e ﬁ r m ’s a c t io n s in
a c c o r d a n c e wit h va r io u s c h a n g e s in t h e e c o n o m ic e n vir o n m e n t . Ou r m o s t s p o n t a n e o u s
e c o n o m ic in t u it io n m ig h t d e e m t h e la c k o f s u c h a d ju s t a b ilit y e c o n o m ic a lly d is a d va n t a -
g e o u s , s u c h t h a t a n y in s t it u t io n h a r b o u r in g u n a d ju s t a b ilit y is c o n s id e r e d e c o n o m ic a lly
ir r a t io n a l. B r o a d ly s p e a kin g , t h e r e a r e t wo a lt e r n a t ive wa ys t o c o u n t e r t h is in t u it io n .
On e is t o t a ke in t o a c c o u n t t h e c o s t s n e e d e d t o m a ke a d ju s t m e n t s . Th e o t h e r , m o r e
in t r ig u in g a lt e r n a t ive in vo lve s t h e qu e s t io n o f wh e t h e r u n a d ju s t a b ilit y m a y e n t a il a n y
g e n u in e e c o n o m ic a d va n t a g e in a c e r t a in c la s s o f c ir c u m s t a n c e s .
In t h is p a p e r , we a n s we r a ﬃ r m a t ive ly t h e a fo r e s a id qu e s t io n . Ou r b a s ic in t u it io n c a n
b e s u m m a t ive ly p r e vie we d a s fo llo ws .
A n is o la t e d in s t it u t io n , in t h e s e n s e o f n o t in t e r a c t in g s t r a t e g ic a lly wit h o t h e r e c o n o m ic
p la ye r s , is u n like ly t o b e n e ﬁ t fr o m it s o wn in ﬂ e xib ilit y. Fo r e xa m p le , a m o n o p o lis t fa ilin g
t o a d ju s t it s p r o d u c t io n le ve l a c c o r d in g t o d e m a n d ﬂ u c t u a t io n s , will p r o d u c e t h e s a m e
qu a n t it y wh e t h e r t h e d e m a n d is h ig h o r lo w, u n d e r p r o d u c in g r e la t ive t o h ig h d e m a n d in a
1b o o m o ve r p r o d u c in g r e la t ive t o lo w d e m a n d in a r e c e s s io n , r e s u lt in g in p r o ﬁ t r e d u c t io n s
in b o t h s t a t e s o f d e m a n d .
On c e t h e in s t it u t io n b e c o m e s in vo lve d in s t r a t e g ic in t e r a c t io n s , it s in ﬂ e xib ilit y m a y
in d u c e t h o s e r e a c t io n s fr o m o p p o n e n t in s t it u t io n s wh ic h c a n t u r n o u t b e n e ﬁ c ia l in s o m e , if
n o t a ll, s t a t e s o f n a t u r e . Fo r in s t a n c e , if a Co u r n o t o lig o p o lis t fa ils t o a d ju s t it s p r o d u c t io n
a c c o r d in g t o t h e s t a t e o f d e m a n d , it s u n d e r p r o d u c t io n r e la t ive t o b o o m in g d e m a n d will
e n c o u r a g e it s ﬂ e xib le c o m p e t it o r s ’ p r o d u c t io n , fu r t h e r h in d e r in g t h e in ﬂ e xib le o lig o p o lis t ’s
p r o ﬁ t s , wh ils t it s o ve r p r o d u c t io n r e la t ive t o r e c e s s in g d e m a n d will p r e -e m p t it s ﬂ e xib le
o p p o n e n t s ’ p r o d u c t io n t h r o u g h s t r a t e g ic s u b s t it u t io n , b o o s t in g t h e in ﬂ e xib le ﬁ r m ’s p r o ﬁ t s .
Th e r e b y if t h e s e s t r a t e g ic e ﬀe c t s o u t we ig h t h o s e n o n -s t r a t e g ic lo s s e s fr o m in ﬂ e xib ilit y
wh ic h we r e a ls o p r e s e n t in t h e a fo r e m e n t io n e d m o n o p o ly c a s e , t h e n t h e o lig o p o lis t will
n e t t lo s e d u r in g t h e b o o m b u t n e t t g a in d u r in g t h e r e c e s s io n b y o p t in g fo r in ﬂ e xib ilit y.
Th e r e fo r e , if a n in s t it u t io n [i] h a s a n y in c e n t ive t o s m o o t h it s p a yo ﬀs a c r o s s d iﬀe r e n t
s t a t e s o f n a t u r e , a n d [ii] in t e r a c t s s t r a t e g ic a lly wit h o t h e r s wh o a r e c a p a b le o f a d ju s t in g
t h e ir a c t io n s a c c o r d in g t o t h e s t a t e s , t h e n t h e in a b ilit y t o a d ju s t it s o wn a c t io n s m a y s e r ve
t h e in s t it u t io n ’s in t e r e s t s .
A n o t h e r c r u c ia l p r o vis o fo r t h e a b o ve in t u it io n is t h a t it c a n m a t e r ia lis e o n ly if [iii]
t h e in s t it u t io n ’s la c k o f a d ju s t a b ilit y is o b s e r va b le t o it s o p p o n e n t p la ye r s . Fo r , it is t h e ir
r e a c t io n s t o t h e s a id u n a d ju s t a b ilit y t h a t m a y e n t a il t h e a fo r e m e n t io n e d p a yo ﬀ s m o o t h in g
e ﬀe c t . In p la in wo r d s , t h e in s t it u t io n m u s t n o t o n ly la c k a d ju s t a b ilit y, b u t a ls o e s t a b lis h
t h e r e p u t a t io n t h a t it is u n a b le t o a d ju s t , in o r d e r t o r e a p t h e p o s s ib le b e n e ﬁ t o f s t a b ili-
s a t io n .
N o t a b ly, t h e p r e s e n c e o r t h e a b s e n c e o f t h e a b o ve -m e n t io n e d s t r a t e g ic s t a b ilis a t io n
e ﬀe c t d e p e n d s qu a lit a t ive ly u p o n t h e fo r m o f s t r a t e g ic in t e r a c t io n s . It is p r e s e n t , h o we ve r ,
in a b r o a d c la s s o f s t r a t e g ic in t e r a c t io n s wh ic h a r e o f p r a c t ic a l e c o n o m ic r e le va n c e . In fa c t ,
a d ju s t a b ilit y o f in s t it u t io n a l a c t io n s c a n b e , a n d h a s in d e e d b e e n , a n a lys e d in a n u m b e r
o f we ll e s t a b lis h e d m ic r o t h e o r y m o d e ls wh ic h , a s a fo r e s a id , c a n b e d ivid e d in t o t h o s e o n
a d ju s t m e n t c o s t s , a n d t h o s e o n g e n u in e m e r it s o f u n a d ju s t a b ilit y wit h o u t r e c o u r s e t o t h e
p r e s e n c e o f a d ju s t m e n t c o s t s . In p a r t ic u la r , m o d e ls in t h e la t t e r c a t e g o r y fe a t u r e s o m e o f
t h o s e ve r y ke y a t t r ib u t e s e n t a ilin g t h e a fo r e s a id s t a b ilis a t io n e ﬀe c t .
On e o f s u c h a t t r ib u t e s is t h a t a n in s t it u t io n ’s la c k o f a d ju s t a b ilit y, wh e n o b s e r va b le
t o o t h e r p la ye r s , c a n s e r ve a s a s t r a t e g ic c o m m it m e n t d e vic e . S u c h c o m m it m e n t s c a n b e
s o r t e d in t o t wo d im e n s io n s : t o c o m m it b e fo r e in fo r m a t io n a b o u t o t h e r s ’ a c t io n s b e c o m e s
p e r fe c t , wh ic h a llo ws fo r t h e s c o p e t h a t t h e c o m m it t e d p la ye r ’s a c t io n n e e d n o t n e c e s s a r ily
m a ke a b e s t r e s p o n s e a g a in s t o t h e r s ’ a c t io n s , a n d t o c o m m it b e fo r e in fo r m a t io n a b o u t t h e
s t a t e o f n a t u r e c o m p le t e s a n d t h u s t o p la y a n ex ante b u t n o t ex post b e s t r e s p o n s e . In
2t h is p a p e r , we d is c u s s t h e la t t e r in t h e a b s e n c e o f t h e fo r m e r .
Cu r io u s ly, in lit e r a t u r e , s t r a t e g ic c o m m it m e n t s h a s m a in ly b e e n d is c u s s e d in t h e lig h t
o f in fo r m a t io n a l p e r fe c t io n , wh ils t it s o t h e r a s p e c t , in fo r m a t io n a l c o m p le t io n , h a s o ft e n
b e e n t r e a t e d in s o m e wh a t a u xilia r y wa ys . A s t o t h e fo r m e r , n a m e ly c o m m it t in g b e fo r e
o t h e r s ’ m o ve s , t h e va lu e o f s u c h a c o m m it m e n t in s u p e r m o d u la r g a m e s a n d s u b m o d u la r
g a m e s h a s ﬁ r s t b e e n d is c u s s e d in t h e we ll-kn o wn S t a c ke lb e r g m o d e l. Th e s e m in a l c o n t r i-
b u t io n b y Ga l-Or ( 1 9 8 3 ) c o n t r a s t s t h e a d va n t a g e o f S t a c ke lb e r g le a d e r s h ip a g a in s t t h a t
o f S t a c ke lb e r g fo llo we r s h ip , i.e ., t h e g a in s fr o m r e a c t in g o p t im a lly t o t h e le a d e r ’s a c t io n s .
E xp lic it e n d o g e n is a t io n o f le a d e r / fo llo we r s h ip o we s t o t h e “ e xt e n d e d g a m e ” m o d e lle d b y
H a m ilt o n a n d S lu t s ky ( 1 9 9 0 ) , a g a m e a u g m e n t e d wit h a p r e -p la y s t a g e wh e r e e a c h p la ye r
c a n c h o o s e e it h e r t o a c t o r t o wa it .1 Cle a r ly, t h e e s s e n c e o f S t a c ke lb e r g le a d e r -fo llo we r
r e la t io n s in t h e s e s e m in a l m o d e ls c o n c e r n s o n ly in fo r m a t io n a l p e r fe c t io n , n o t in fo r m a -
t io n a l c o m p le t io n , a s t h e s e a r e m o d e ls wit h o u t s t a t e -d e p e n d e n t u n c e r t a in t y. S u b s e qu e n t ly
wh e n t h e e xt e n d e d g a m e is fu r t h e r e xt e n d e d t o e n c o m p a s s d e m a n d u n c e r t a in t y ( e .g ., b y
) t h e a s p e c t o f in fo r m a t io n a l c o m p le t io n c o m e s t o b e a d d e d a s p a r t o f t h e S t a c ke lb e r g
fo llo we r ’s a d va n t a g e . H o we ve r , e ve n t h e n , t h e a d d e d in fo r m a t io n a l a d va n t a g e o f t h e S t a c k-
e lb e r g fo llo we r is m o s t ly c o n s id e r e d a s a “ n o n -s t r a t e g ic a d va n t a g e ” a n d t h u s t h e o ve r a ll
le a d e r -fo llo we r r e la t io n t e n d s t o b e t r e a t e d a s t h e b a la n c e b e t we e n t h e fo llo we r ’s n o n -
s t r a t e g ic a d va n t a g e o f in fo r m a t io n a l c o m p le t io n ve r s u s t h e le a d e r ’s s t r a t e g ic p r e -e m p t ive
a d va n t a g e .
On t h e o t h e r h a n d , a p p a r e n t ly fo r n o o b vio u s r e a s o n , s t r a t e g ic c o m m it m e n t in t h e lig h t
o f in fo r m a t io n a l c o m p le t io n h a s a t t r a c t e d r e la t ive ly s c a r c e r e s e a r c h a t t e n t io n . A m o n g s t
t h o s e fe w s t u d ie s wh ic h d id n o t o ve r lo o k t h is a s p e c t , S a ka i ( 1 9 8 5 , 1 9 9 0 , 1 9 9 1 ) a n a lys e s h o w
t h e va lu e o f in fo r m a t io n a b o u t t h e s t a t e s o f d e m a n d c a n b e a ﬀe c t e d via d u o p o lis t ic in t e r -
a c t io n s . In g e n e r a l, t h e va lu e a s t r a t e g ic c o m m it m e n t in t h is s e n s e , i.e ., m a kin g a m o ve o r
a t le a s t c o m m it t in g wit h a n a c t io n wit h o u t wa it in g fo r t h e s t a t e o f n a t u r e t o u n fo ld , is t h e
n e g a t ive o f t h e va lu e o f in fo r m a t io n a b o u t t h e s t a t e o f n a t u r e , a n d h e n c e it s ex ante e xp e c -
t a t io n is g e n e r a lly n e g a t ive . H o we ve r , it s ex post r e a lis a t io n m a y t u r n o u t p o s it ive in s o m e
s t a t e s a n d n e g a t ive in s o m e o t h e r s t a t e s . H a n s e n , Mø llg a a r d , Ove r g a a r d a n d S ø r e n s e n
( 1 9 9 6 ) t o u c h e s t h is is s u e in d ir e c t ly, in s h o win g t h a t a n o lig o p o lis t h a s a s t r a t e g ic in c e n t ive
t o a d ju s t it s a c t io n a s ym m e t r ic a lly b e t we e n u n e xp e c t e d d e m a n d s u r g e a n d u n e xp e c t e d
d e m a n d s lu m p , d u e t o t h e m o n o t o n e c o m p a r a t ive s t a t ic s r e g a r d in g t h e s t r a t e g ic in t e r -
a c t io n a m o n g t h e o lig o p o lis t s . Mo r e g e n e r a lly, if t h e r e a r e r e a lis t ic a lly c o n c e iva b le s it u a -
t io n s s u c h t h a t a p la ye r h a s r e a s o n t o r e g a r d t h o s e s t a t e s wh e r e p r e c o m m it m e n t p r o ve s
ex post p r o ﬁ t a b le m o r e im p o r t a n t ly t h a n o t h e r s t a t e s wh e r e p r e c o m m it m e n t t u r n s o u t
1The extended game has two versions, one called the extended game with observable delay, the other
called the extended game with action commitment. The distinction between these two categories is not
directly relevant to our purposes in this paper.
3ex post u n p r o ﬁ t a b le , t h e n it m a ke s s e n s e t o fo r fe it t h e ﬂ e xib ilit y o f a d ju s t in g a c t io n s
a c c o r d in g t o r e a lis e d s t a t e s a n d t h u s t o p r e c o m m it , e ve n wh e n s u c h p r e c o m m it m e n t d o e s
n o t e n t a il S t a c ke lb e r g le a d e r s h ip .
On e s u c h s it u a t io n c a n b e fo u n d in in s t it u t io n a l r is k a ve r s io n wh e r e , b y d e ﬁ n it io n , lo w
in c o m e s t a t e s a r e m o r e o f in s t it u t io n a l c o n c e r n s t h a n h ig h in c o m e s t a t e s . Th e r e fo r e , if t h e
ex post va lu e o f p r e c o m m it m e n t is p o s it ive in t h e lo we r in c o m e s t a t e s a n d is n e g a t ive in
t h e h ig h e r in c o m e s t a t e s , t h e n a r is k-a ve r s e in s t it u t io n m ig h t r ig h t fu lly o p t t o p r e c o m m it ,
in s p it e o f it s n e g a t ive e xp e c t e d va lu e a s a fo r e m e n t io n e d .
P r e s u m a b ly, a p o s s ib le s o u r c e o f in s t it u t io n a l r is k a ve r s io n m a y b e lo c a t e d in m a n a g e r ia l
in c e n t ive s . N a m e ly, a m a n a g e r ia l jo b c a n b e r is ke d if t h e ﬁ r m ’s p r o ﬁ t s im p lo d e s p r e c ip -
it o u s ly. A m a n a g e r in s u c h a p o s it io n m a y t h e r e fo r e o p t fo r a r is k a ve r s e p a t t e r n o f
d e c is io n m a kin g e ve n if t h e ﬁ r m ’s a u t h e n t ic o b je c t ive r e m a in s in r is k-n e u t r a l e xp e c t e d
p r o ﬁ t m a xim is a t io n .
In fa c t , e ve n wit h o u t r e g a r d t o t h e is s u e o f m a n a g e r ia l in c e n t ive s , a ﬁ r m ’s p o s t -t a x
p r o ﬁ t s m a y we ll b e m a d e a c o n c a ve fu n c t io n o f it s p r e -t a x p r o ﬁ t s , d u e t o t h e p r o g r e s s ivit y
o f c o r p o r a t e p r o ﬁ t t a xa t io n . Fo r in s t a n c e , p r o ﬁ t t a x r a t e s a r e g e n e r a lly p o s it ive wh e n t h e
ﬁ r m ’s t a xa b le p r o ﬁ t s a r e p o s it ive , b u t z e r o if it s t a xa b le p r o ﬁ t s a r e n e g a t ive , in d u c in g t h e
ﬁ r m t o b e lo s s a ve r s e r a t h e r t h a n t r u ly r is k n e u t r a l.
To d e ve lo p in t u it io n , in t h e p r e s e n t p a p e r we u s e fa m ilia r lin e a r -qu a d r a t ic o lig o p o ly
m o d e ls t o e xe m p lify t h o s e s it u a t io n s wh e r e in s t it u t io n a l r is k a ve r s io n a s a fo r e s a id m a y
in d e e d ﬁ n d it a g r e e a b le n o t t o r e s o lve in fo r m a t io n a l in c o m p le t io n . A s we o b s e r ve in
s e c t io n s 2 a n d 3 , a n o lig o p o lis t wh o fa ils t o a d ju s t e it h e r it s o u t p u t qu a n t it y ( Co u r n o t )
o r p r ic e ( B e r t r a n d ) a c c o r d in g t o s t o c h a s t ic d e m a n d ﬂ u c t u a t io n s , e a r n s lo we r e xp e c t e d
p r o ﬁ t s b o t h t h a n it s o p p o n e n t wh o is s wift e r in a d ju s t in g e it h e r p r ic e s o r qu a n t it ie s , a n d
a ls o t h a n in t h e c a s e wh e r e t h e ﬁ r m it s e lf is a s ﬂ e xib le a s it s o p p o n e n t s . H o we ve r , in a n
u n e xp e c t e d ly lo w s t a t e o f d e m a n d , t h e in ﬂ e xib le ﬁ r m s e c u r e s a h ig h e r p r o ﬁ t t h a n wh e n
t h e ﬁ r m is a d ju s t a b le , in e xc h a n g e fo r a s a c r iﬁ c e in p r o ﬁ t wh e n t h e d e m a n d is h ig h .
Th e r e fo r e if, fo r s o m e r e a s o n s u c h a s m a n a g e r ia l r is k a ve r s io n , t h e ﬁ r m wa n t s t o s m o o t h
it s p r o ﬁ t s t h r o u g h o u t d iﬀe r e n t s t a t e s o f d e m a n d , t h e s a id in a d ju s t m e n t m a y in d e e d s e r ve
t h e p u r p o s e .
In s e c t io n 2 we m o d e l a s im p le lin e a r -qu a d r a t ic Co u r n o t d u o p o ly `a la D ixit ( 1 9 8 3 )
a n d S in g h a n d V ive s ( 1 9 8 4 ) , wh ic h a llo ws fo r im p e r fe c t d e m a n d s u b s t it u t io n ( in o t h e r
wo r d s , p r o d u c t d iﬀe r e n t ia t io n ) b e t we e n t h e t wo ﬁ r m s ’ p r o d u c t s t o m a in t a in g e n e r a lit y
a n d a ls o t o b e c o n s is t e n t in t r e a t m e n t wit h o u r B e r t r a n d a n a lys is in s e c t io n 3 . S e c t io n 4
p r o vid e s e c o n o m ic e xp la n a t io n s wh y a n d h o w t h e a fo r e s a id p r o ﬁ t s m o o t h in g e ﬀe c t a r is e s
t h r o u g h e it h e r s t r a t e g ic c o m p le m e n t a r it y o r s t r a t e g ic s u b s t it u t io n . S e c t io n 5 s e p a r a t e s
4we lfa r e is s u e s fr o m o u r m a in a n a lys is o n ﬁ r m s ’ s t r a t e g ic in c e n t ive s a n d e xp la in b r ie ﬂ y
wh y s u c h s e p a r a t io n is d u e . S e c t io n 6 c o n c lu d e s t h e p a p e r b y s u m m a r is in g o u r ﬁ n d in g s
in t e r c o n n e c t in g a ﬁ r m ’s e xt e r n a l b e h a vio u r a l c o n s e r va t is m a n d it s in t e r n a l r e m u n e r a t ive
c o n s e r va t is m .
2 Cour not duopoly with stochastic demand







 a − q1 − γq2
a − γq1 − q2

 ( 2 .0 .1 )
wh e r e γ is a c o m m o n ly kn o wn p a r a m e t e r in d ic a t in g t h e d e m a n d s u b s t it u t a b ilit y b e t we e n
t h e t wo ﬁ r m s ’ p r o d u c t s , a n d a is a r a n d o m va r ia b le wit h a u n it m e a n . A s s u m e fo r
s im p lic it y t h a t p r o d u c t io n c o s t s a r e in s u b s t a n t ia l, a n d t h a t γ ∈ [1 −
√
3 ,1 ] fo r a lg e b r a ic
s im p lic it y. N o t e t h a t γ > 0 e n t a ils a s t r a t e g ic s u b s t it u t io n ( s u b m o d u la r ) g a m e wh e r e a s
γ < 0 a s t r a t e g ic c o m p le m e n t a r it y ( s u p e r m o d u la r ) g a m e .
2.1 Symmetr ic infor mation games
A s b e n c h m a r ks , we d e ﬁ n e t h e fo llo win g t wo a lt e r n a t ive in fo r m a t io n a l s t r u c t u r e s , b o t h o f
wh ic h a r e s ym m e t r ic b e t we e n t h e d u o p o lis t s .
B enchmar k game AA : B o t h o lig o p o lis t s a r e “ a d ju s t a b le ,” i.e ., c a p a b le o f c h o o s in g
t h e ir r e s p e c t ive s u p p ly qu a n t it ie s q1 a n d q2 in a c c o r d a n c e wit h t h e s t a t e o f d e m a n d
a.
Th e Co u r n o t -N a s h e qu ilib r iu m o f t h is g a m e is q1 = q2 =
a
2 + γ
, wit h t h e r e s u lt in g







. ( 2 .1 .1 )
B enchmar k game UU : B o t h ﬁ r m s a r e “ u n a d ju s t a b le ,” i.e ., s u p p ly a c o n s t a n t qu a n t it y
ir r e s p e c t ive o f t h e s t a t e o f d e m a n d .
Th e Co u r n o t -N a s h e qu ilib r iu m is q1 = q2 =
1
2 + γ










. ( 2 .1 .2 )
52.2 Asymmetr ic infor mation game
W e n o w c o n s id e r t h e c a s e wh e r e o n ly o n e d u o p o lis t c a n u t ilis e t h e in fo r m a t io n a b o u t t h e
s t a t e o f d e m a n d b e fo r e d e c id in g it s p r o d u c t io n . Ou r m o d e l e xp r e s s ly p r e c lu d e s s it u a t io n s
wh e r e e it h e r ﬁ r m c a n m a ke a p o s it ive c o m m it m e n t t o a ﬀo r d a S t a c ke lb e r g le a d e r s h ip .
Th e r e fo r e in o u r m o d e l, n e it h e r ﬁ r m is a le a d e r n o r a fo llo we r . Th e d u o p o lis t s t h u s
c o m p e t e a s s im u lt a n e o u s m o ve r s . H o we ve r , o n ly o n e o f t h e m is , a n d is we ll r e p u t e d t o
b e , r e c e p t ive o f in fo r m a t io n r e le va n t t o t h e s t a t e o f d e m a n d , e .g ., it s c u s t o m e r s ’ o p in io n s .
Th e o t h e r ﬁ r m is , a n d is kn o wn t o b e , d e a f t o s u c h in fo r m a t io n .
Th e Co u r n o t -N a s h o f t h is a s ym m e t r ic in fo r m a t io n d u o p o ly is fo r t h e u n a d ju s t a b le
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( 2 .2 .1 )









2 ( 2 + γ)
( 2 .2 .2 )
fo r t h e u n a d ju s t a b le ﬁ r m .
2.3 Value of adjustability and commitments
V a lu e o f a d ju s t a b ilit y fo r e a c h ﬁ r m s h o u ld b e e va lu a t e d a s t h e e qu ilib r iu m p r o ﬁ t d iﬀe r -
e n t ia l b e t we e n wh e n t h e ﬁ r m is a d ju s t a b le a n d wh e n it is u n a d ju s t a b le , g ive n it s c o m p e t it o r ’s
( u n ) a d ju s t a b ilit y.
Lemma i : E[πAA[a]] > E[πUA[a]] a n d E[πAU[a]] > E[πUU[a]].
In wo r d s , it is e xp e c t e d ly p r o ﬁ t a b le fo r a ﬁ r m t o u t ilis e in fo r m a t io n a b o u t t h e s t a t e
o f d e m a n d a n d t h u s t o a d ju s t it s p r o d u c t io n , wh e t h e r t h e o p p o n e n t d o e s like wis e
o r o t h e r wis e .
Lemma ii : E[πAA[a]] − E[πUA[a]] <
> E[πAU[a]] − E[πUU[a]] if a n d o n ly if γ >
< 0 .
Th a t is , a ﬁ r m ’s e xp e c t e d m a r g in a l g a in fr o m a d ju s t a b ilit y is h ig h e r ( r e s p . lo we r )
wh e n t h e o p p o n e n t is u n a d ju s t a b le , t h a n wh e n t h e o p p o n e n t is a d ju s t a b le , wh e n
t h e s e d u o p o lis t s s u p p ly s u b s t it u t io n a l ( r e s p . c o m p le m e n t a r y) p r o d u c t s . In o t h e r
wo r d s , t h e b e n e ﬁ t s fr o m a d ju s t a b ilit y a r e s u b s t it u t io n a l o r c o m p le m e n t a r y b e t we e n
t h e Co u r n o t o lig o p o lis t s wh e n , a n d o n ly wh e n , t h e g a m e is s u b m o d u la r o r s u p e r -
m o d u la r , r e s p e c t ive ly.
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( 2 .3 .2 )
fr o m ( 2 .2 .1 ) a n d ( 2 .1 .2 ) .
P r oposition 1 : πAA[1 ] = πUA[1 ] a n d πAA￿[1 ] > πUA￿[1 ] > 0 .
N a m e ly, in t h e n e ig h b o u r h o o d a ≈ 1 , π
UA[a] <
> π
AA[a] ⇐⇒ a >
< 1 .
P r oof : ( 2 .1 .1 ) a n d ( 2 .2 .2 ) im p ly π
AA[1 ] = π
UA[1 ] =
1
( 2 + γ) 2 , wh ic h im m e d ia t e ly
p r o ve s t h e fo r m e r h a lf o f P r o p o s it io n 1 . A ls o fo llo ws fr o m ( 2 .1 .1 ) a n d ( 2 .2 .2 ) t h e





















( 2 + γ) 2
wh ic h p r o ve s t h e la t t e r h a lf o f P r o p o s it io n 1 .
P r oposition 2 : πAU[a] ≥ πUU[a] fo r a ll a, a n d πAU[a] > πUU[a] fo r a ll a ￿= 1 .
P r oof fo llo ws d ir e c t ly fr o m ( 2 .2 .1 ) a n d ( 2 .1 .2 ) .
P r o p o s it io n 2 e n s u r e s t h a t πAU[a] ﬁ r s t -o r d e r s t o c h a s t ic d o m in a t e s πUU[a], wh e r e a s P r o p o -
s it io n 1 r e ve a ls t h a t πAA[a] g e n e r a lly ( i.e ., fo r a g e n e r a l d is t r ib u t io n o f a) n e it h e r ﬁ r s t -
n o r s e c o n d -o r d e r s t o c h a s t ic d o m in a t e s πUA[a].
2.4 Choices of adjustability
W e n o w h yp o t h e s is e a n e n vir o n m e n t wh e r e ﬁ r m s m a y c h o o s e wh e t h e r t o b e a b le t o a d ju s t
p r o d u c t io n a c c o r d in g t o t h e s t a t e o f d e m a n d . Th a t is , we im p ly a n e xt e n d e d d u o p o ly
g a m e u n fo ld in g t h r o u g h t h e fo llo win g t wo s t a g e s .
1 . In t h e b e g in n in g , e a c h o f t h e d u o p o lis t s c h o o s e s t o b e e it h e r “ a d ju s t a b le ” b e in g
c a p a b le o f d e c id in g it s s u p p ly qu a n t it y a ft e r o b s e r vin g t h e s t a t e o f d e m a n d a, o r
“ u n a d ju s t a b le ” h a vin g t o d e c id e it s o u t p u t wit h o u t r e g a r d t o t h e s t a t e .
A d ju s t a b ilit y o f e a c h ﬁ r m t h e n b e c o m e s c o m m o n ly o b s e r va b le .
2 . Th e t wo ﬁ r m s t h e n s im u lt a n e o u s ly a n d in d e p e n d e n t ly d e c id e h o w m u c h t o p r o d u c e ,
wh e r e b y t h e Co u r n o t d u o p o ly m a t e r ia lis e s .
7L e m m a i s h o ws t h a t , if ﬁ r m s a c t g e n u in e ly a s e xp e c t e d p r o ﬁ t m a xim is e r s , t h e y s h o u ld
in va r ia b ly o p t fo r fu ll a d ju s t a b ilit y. W h e n we t r e a t a ﬁ r m a s a s in g le e n t it y in , s a y, a
g a m e -t h e o r e t ic o lig o p o ly m o d e l, a s s e e m s t h e c a s e in s t a n d a r d m ic r o e c o n o m ic t h e o r y t o
t h is d a t e , it is u s u a lly a s s u m e d a s a r is k-n e u t r a l p r o ﬁ t m a xim is e r wh o s e in t e r n a l d e c is io n
m a kin g p r o c e d u r e s a r e b la c kb o xe d a n d t h u s u n qu e s t io n e d . Th u s in s u c h a t r a d it io n a l
t e xt b o o k-like fr a m e wo r k, in s t it u t io n a l c o n s e r va t is m c o u ld n o t e a s ily b e e n d o g e n is e d .
In r e a lit y, h o we ve r , t h e c o m p le xit y o f in t r a -o r g a n is a t io n a l in c e n t ive s m a y b e n d in s t it u -
t io n a l d e c is io n s a wa y fr o m p u r e p r o ﬁ t m a xim is a t io n . If, fo r in s t a n c e , m a n a g e r ia l c o m p e n -
s a t io n s a r e p r o p o r t io n a t e t o t h e ﬁ r m ’s p r o ﬁ t s e xc e p t wh e n t h e p r o ﬁ t s t a ke a p r e c ip it o u s
n o s e -d ive in wh ic h c a s e t h e m a n a g e r s in c h a r g e r is ks t h e ir p o s it io n s , t h e n it is fo r e s e e n
t h a t t h e m a n a g e r ia l b o a r d m e m b e r s b e h a ve a s if r is k-a ve r s e . Co r p o r a t e c o n s e r va t is m m a y
a ls o a r is e d u e t o p r o g r e s s ive p r o ﬁ t t a xa t io n , s u c h a s p o s it ive t a x r a t e s fo r p o s it ive t a xa b le
p r o ﬁ t s wh ils t z e r o t a x r a t e s fo r n e g a t ive p r o ﬁ t s .2
P r o p o s it io n 2 im p lie s t h a t a ﬁ r m s h o u ld u n e qu ivo c a lly o p t fo r fu ll a d ju s t a b ilit y ir r e s p e c -
t ive ly o f it s r is k a t t it u d e in s o fa r a s it s o p p o n e n t la c ks s u c h a d ju s t a b ilit y. H o we ve r , P r o p o -
s it io n 1 s h o ws t h a t , g ive n ﬁ r m 1 b e in g a d ju s t a b le , ﬁ r m 2 ’s p r o ﬁ t s a r e le s s vo la t ile a c r o s s
t h e s t a t e s o f d e m a n d wh e n ﬁ r m 2 is u n a d ju s t a b le t h a n wh e n a d ju s t a b le . Th e r e fo r e if,
fo r e xa m p le , t h e m a n a g e r ia l r e m u n e r a t io n s c h e m e in ﬁ r m 2 is p r o ﬁ t d e p e n d e n t in t h e
a fo r e m e n t io n e d wa y, t h e ( a s if) r is k a ve r s e m a n a g e r ia l d e c is io n m ig h t a g r e e t o a c c e p t t h e
lo s s in e xp e c t e d p r o ﬁ t s ,
V a r [a]
( 2 + γ) 2 a s c a lc u la t e d in ( 2 .3 .1 ) , a s a n a ﬀo r d a b le “ in s u r a n c e fe e .”
In s u c h a n e n vir o n m e n t , o n e o f t h e d u o p o lis t s o p t in g fo r a d ju s t a b ilit y wh ils t t h e o t h e r
b e in g u n a d ju s t a b le m a y m a t e r ia lis e a s t h e p r o ﬁ le o f e n d o g e n o u s c h o ic e s .3 Ot h e r wis e ,
if ﬁ r m s a c t s u ﬃ c ie n t ly r is k-n e u t r a lly, t h e n b o t h ﬁ r m s s h a ll o p t fo r a d ju s t a b ilit y. A s
a s c e r t a in e d b y P r o p o s it io n 2 , b o t h ﬁ r m s o p t in g fo r u n a d ju s t a b ilit y c a n n e ve r b e c h o s e n
e n d o g e n o u s ly.
2.5 A numer ical illustr ation
Fo r t h e s a ke o f c o n c r e t e n e s s , le t a b e e it h e r 0 .9 5 in r e c e s s io n o r 1 .0 5 in b o o m wit h p r o b a -
b ilit y o n e h a lf e a c h . V a r yin g t h e in t e r -ﬁ r m d e m a n d s u b s t it u t a b ilit y γ , we o b t a in Ta b le 1
( s e e A p p e n d ix) .
2Typically, even when a ﬁrm’s nett proﬁt is positive, not its entirety is taxable. Legal taxable proﬁts
can be zero even when the ﬁrm is earning modest positive proﬁts. Thereby the said progressivity takes
its eﬀect in the interior of the “positive proﬁts” range in our deﬁnition.
3It has been assumed throughout 2.2 that an unadjustable ﬁrm still maximises its expected proﬁts when
deciding its supply level. This can be interpreted, for example, as the production decision being operative,
i.e., an employee decision rather than managerial, whilst the structural choice between adjustability and
unadjustability being a matter of top management.
8W h e n t h e s u b s t it u t a b ilit y p a r a m e t e r γ is c lo s e t o z e r o , t h e a fo r e s a id p r o ﬁ t in s u r a n c e
e ﬀe c t o f u n a d ju s t a b ilit y is in s u b s t a n t ia l, a n d t h u s P r o p o s it io n 1 is o p e r a t ive o n ly in a
ve r y s m a ll n e ig h b o u r h o o d a r o u n d a ≈ 1 . Th is r e ﬂ e c t s t h e fa c t t h a t t h e in s u r a n c e e ﬀe c t
is g e n e r a t e d b y t h e s t r a t e g ic in t e r a c t io n b e t we e n t h e ﬁ r m s ( a s s h a ll b e e xp o u n d e d in
s e c t io n 4 ) , a n d t h a t s u c h in t e r a c t io n is we a k wh e n |γ| is lo w. W h e n |γ| is a s lo w a s 0 .3 ,
e ve n a m o d e r a t e d e m a n d ﬂ u c t u a t io n s u c h a s a ∈ {0 .9 5 ,1 .0 5 } a lr e a d y lie s b e yo n d t h e
s c o p e o f P r o p o s it io n 1 , s o t h a t πAA[a] d o m in a t e s πUA[a] in b o t h s t a t e s , r e n d e r in g t h e
p r o ﬁ t in s u r a n c e e ﬀe c t in o p e r a t ive . H o we ve r , a s s o o n a s |γ| b e c o m e s h ig h e n o u g h , t h e
r a n g e wh e r e P r o p o s it io n 1 is r e le va n t e n la r g e s , s o t h a t t h e in s u r a n c e e ﬀe c t g r o ws r a p id ly.
Cle a r ly fr o m t h e t a b le , πUA[a] is n o t e ve n s e c o n d -o r d e r s t o c h a s t ic d o m in a t e d b y πAA[a].
W h e n γ = 1 , t h a t is wh e n t h e d u o p o lis t s s u p p ly p e r fe c t s u b s t it u t e s , if b o t h ﬁ r m s a r e
a d ju s t a b le , t h e r e c e s s io n p r o ﬁ t πAA[0 .9 5 ] = 0 .1 0 0 2 ˙ 7 is 1 8 .1 4 % b e lo w t h e b o o m p r o ﬁ t
πAA[1 .0 5 ] = 0 .1 2 2 5 , wh e r e a s if o n e ﬁ r m s wit c h e s t o u n a d ju s t a b ilit y, it s r e c e s s io n p r o ﬁ t
πUA[0 .9 5 ] = 0 .1 0 2 ˙ 7 is o n ly 1 3 .9 5 % b e lo w it s b o o m p r o ﬁ t πUA[1 .0 5 ] = 0 .1 1 9 ˙ 4 . H e n c e if t h e
la t t e r s e c u r e s t h e m a n a g e r ia l jo b s a n d r e m u n e r a t io n s b e t t e r t h a n t h e fo r m e r , t h e m a n a g e r s
m a y we ll b e willin g t o s a c r iﬁ c e t h e e xp e c t e d p r o ﬁ t d iﬀe r e n c e E[πAA[a]] − E[πUA[a]] =
0 .0 0 0 2 ˙ 7 a s a n a ﬀo r d a b le in s u r a n c e fe e .
Me a n wh ile , πAU[a] a lwa ys ﬁ r s t -o r d e r s t o c h a s t ic d o m in a t e s πUU[a], in d ic a t in g t h a t a t
le a s t o n e ﬁ r m m u s t r e t a in a d ju s t a b ilit y r e g a r d le s s o f it s r is k a t t it u d e .4
S im ila r t e n d e n c ie s a r e p r e s e n t in t h e c o m p le m e n t a r it y r a n g e γ < 0 a s s u m m a r is e d
in Ta b le 2 ( in A p p e n d ix) . Th e o n ly qu a lit a t ive d iﬀe r e n c e is t h a t πAU[a] is e ve n b e t t e r
in s u r e d t h a n πUA[a] ( t h a t is , πUA[0 .9 5 ] < πAU[0 .9 5 ] < πAU[1 .0 5 ] < πUA[1 .0 5 ]) , wh e r e a s
πAU[a] s u ﬀe r e d a ve r y s iz e a b le s p r e a d b e t we e n t h e r e c e s s io n a n d t h e b o o m p r o ﬁ t s in t h e
p r e vio u s s u b s t it u t io n r a n g e γ > 0 . In o t h e r wo r d s , u n d e r s t r a t e g ic c o m p le m e n t a r it y, t h e
p r o ﬁ t in s u r a n c e e ﬀe c t r e s u lt in g fr o m a ﬁ r m ’s n o n -a d ju s t m e n t s p ills m o r e h e a vily o ve r
in s u r in g it s o p p o n e n t ’s p r o ﬁ t t h a n in s u r in g t h e ﬁ r m ’s o wn p r o ﬁ t .
3 B er tr and duopoly with stochastic demand
W e n o w c o n t e m p la t e a t wo -s t a g e g a m e a n a lo g o u s t o t h a t d e ﬁ n e d in 2 .1 e xc e p t t h a t t h e
ﬁ r m s a r e n o w B e r t r a n d d u o p o lis t s . In ve r t in g t h e s ys t e m ( 2 .0 .1 ) , we o b t a in t h e s ys t e m o f
d e m a n d
4If, however, managerial contracts are susceptible to punitive dismissal based upon a serial decline in
proﬁts, then the relative ratio (or spread) between πAU[0.95] and πAU[1.05] or that between πUU[0.95]
and πUU[1.05] shall be more material than the absolute proﬁt levels, whereby proﬁt smoothing incentives









 ( 1 − γ) a − p1 + γp2
( 1 − γ) a + γp1 − p2

. ( 3 .0 .1 )
Fo r t e c h n ic a l s im p lic it y, we lim it o u r a t t e n t io n t o t h e r a n g e γ ∈ ( −1 ,
√
3 − 1 ] wh e r e b y
p r e c lu s io n o f t h e s o -c a lle d B e r t r a n d p a r a d o x fa c ilit a t e s o u r a n a lys is h e r e in a ft e r .
3.1 Symmetr ic infor mation games
A s in 2 .1 , we d e ﬁ n e t h e fo llo win g t wo a lt e r n a t ive in fo r m a t io n a l s t r u c t u r e s a s b e n c h m a r ks ,
b o t h o f wh ic h a r e s ym m e t r ic b e t we e n t h e d u o p o lis t s .
B enchmar k game aa : B o t h o lig o p o lis t s a r e “ a d ju s t a b le ,” i.e ., c a p a b le o f c h a r g in g t h e ir
r e s p e c t ive s a le s p r ic e s p1 a n d p2 a c c o r d in g t o t h e s t a t e o f d e m a n d a.
Th e B e r t r a n d -N a s h e qu ilib r iu m m a t e r ia lis e s a s p1 = p2 =
1 − γ
2 + γ
a, wh e r e b y e a c h




( 1 + γ) ( 2 − γ) 2 a
2. ( 3 .1 .1 )
B enchmar k game uu : B o t h ﬁ r m s a r e “ u n a d ju s t a b le ,” i.e ., c h a r g e a c o n s t a n t p r ic e
ir r e s p e c t ive o f t h e s t a t e o f d e m a n d .
Th e B e r t r a n d -N a s h e qu ilib r iu m is p1 = p2 =
1 − γ
2 − γ




( 1 + γ) ( 2 − γ) 2
￿
( 2 − γ) a − ( 1 − γ)
￿
. ( 3 .1 .2 )
3.2 Asymmetr ic infor mation game
W h e n o n e ﬁ r m is a d ju s t a b le wh ils t t h e o t h e r is u n a d ju s t a b le , t h e la t t e r c h a r g e s pi =
1 − γ
2 − γ




( 2 − γ) a + γ
2





( 1 + γ) ( 2 − γ) 2
￿
( 2 − γ) a + γ
2
￿2
( 3 .2 .1 )




( 1 + γ) ( 2 − γ) 2 ·
( 4 − γ2) a − ( 2 − γ2)
2
( 3 .2 .2 )
fo r t h e u n a d ju s t a b le ﬁ r m , a s s u m in g t h a t va r ia t io n s in a a r e s m a ll e n o u g h fo r e it h e r ﬁ r m
t o a va il o f a n in t e r io r o p t im u m .
1 03.3 Value of adjustability and commitments
B e r t r a n d a n a lo g u e s o f L e m m a t a i, ii a n d P r o p o s it io n s 1 , 2 a r e a s fo llo ws .
Lemma iii : E[yaa[a]] > E[yua[a]] a n d E[yau[a]] > E[yuu[a]].
In wo r d s , it is e xp e c t e d ly m o r e p r o ﬁ t a b le fo r a ﬁ r m t o b e a d ju s t a b le t h a n t o b e
u n a d ju s t a b le , wh a t e ve r t h e o p p o n e n t ’s a d ju s t a b ilit y.
Lemma iv : E[yaa[a]] − E[yua[a]] >
< E[yau[a]] − E[yuu[a]] if a n d o n ly if γ >
< 0 .
Co n t r a r y t o L e m m a ii in t h e Co u r n o t c a s e , a ﬁ r m ’s e xp e c t e d m a r g in a l g a in fr o m
a d ju s t a b ilit y is h ig h e r ( r e s p ., lo we r ) wh e n t h e o p p o n e n t is a ls o a d ju s t a b le , t h a n wh e n
t h e o p p o n e n t is u n a d ju s t a b le . N a m e ly, t h e b e n e ﬁ t s fr o m a d ju s t a b ilit y a r e e it h e r
c o m p le m e n t a r y o r s u b s t it u t io n a l b e t we e n t h e B e r t r a n d o lig o p o lis t s d e p e n d in g u p o n
wh e t h e r t h e ir p r ic in g a c t io n s a r e s t r a t e g ic c o m p le m e n t s o r s u b s t it u t e s , r e s p e c t ive ly.




( 1 − γ) V a r [a]
( 1 + γ) ( 2 − γ) 2 ( 3 .3 .1 )




( 1 − γ) V a r [a]
4 ( 1 + γ)
. ( 3 .3 .2 )
P r oposition 3 : yaa[1 ] = yua[1 ] a n d yaa￿[1 ] > yua￿[1 ].
N a m e ly, in t h e n e ig h b o u r h o o d a ≈ 1 , y
ua[a] <
> y
aa[a] ⇐⇒ a >
< 1 .
P r oof : ( 3 .1 .1 ) a n d ( 3 .2 .2 ) im p ly y
aa[1 ] = y
ua[1 ] =
1 − γ
( 1 + γ) ( 2 − γ) 2 , a n d a ls o t h e

























2 ( 1 − γ)
( 1 + γ) ( 2 − γ) 2 .
P r oposition 4 : yau[a] ≥ yuu[a] fo r a ll a, a n d yau[a] > yuu[a] fo r a ll a ￿= 1 .
P r oof fo llo ws d ir e c t ly fr o m ( 3 .2 .1 ) a n d ( 3 .1 .2 ) .
P r o p o s it io n 4 e n s u r e s t h a t yau[a] ﬁ r s t -o r d e r s t o c h a s t ic d o m in a t e s yuu[a], wh e r e a s P r o p o -
s it io n 5 p r o vid e s t h a t , fo r g e n e r a l d is t r ib u t io n s o f a, yaa[a] n e it h e r ﬁ r s t - n o r s e c o n d -o r d e r
s t o c h a s t ic d o m in a t e s yua[a].
1 13.4 A numer ical illustr ation
A n a lo g o u s ly t o 2 .5 in o u r fo r e g o in g Co u r n o t m o d e l, we le t a b e e it h e r 0 .9 5 o r 1 .0 5 wit h
p r o b a b ilit y o n e h a lf e a c h , t o t a b u la t e in Ta b le s 3 a n d 4 ( s e e A p p e n d ix) B e r t r a n d p r o ﬁ t s
a s fu n c t io n s o f γ .
S im ila r ly t o 2 .4 a n d 2 .5 in t h e Co u r n o t g a m e , yau[a] ﬁ r s t -o r d e r s t o c h a s t ic d o m in a t e s
yuu[a], wh ils t yaa[a] g e n e r a lly d o e s n o t yua. Th e r e fo r e g ive n ﬁ r m 1 ’s a d ju s t a b ilit y, ﬁ r m
2 c a n e a r n p r o ﬁ t s t h a t a r e le s s vo la t ile in a b y b e in g u n a d ju s t a b le , wit h a s a c r iﬁ c e
o f
( 1 − γ) V a r [a]
( 1 + γ) ( 2 − γ) 2 a s s h o wn in ( 3 .3 .1 ) . N o t e o n t h e o t h e r h a n d t h a t yau[a] d o m in a t e s
yuu[a] fo r a ll a. A d ju s t a b ilit y t h u s u n a m b ig u o u s ly p r o ﬁ t s a ﬁ r m a g a in s t it s u n a d ju s t a b le
o p p o n e n t .
Op p o s it e fr o m o u r p r e vio u s Co u r n o t e xa m p le , h e r e in B e r t r a n d yua[a] is b e t t e r in s u r e d
t h a n a n y o t h e r p r o ﬁ t s in t h a t r a n g e wh e r e γ < 0 ( Ta b le 4 ) , wh e r e a s it r e s u lt s in in s u r in g
yau wh e n γ > 0 ( Ta b le 3 ) . It is a n a lo g o u s t o t h e Co u r n o t c a s e , h o we ve r , t h a t t h e fo r m e r
c o r r e s p o n d s t o s t r a t e g ic s u b s t it u t io n ( s u b m o d u la r it y) wh ils t t h e la t t e r c o r r e s p o n d s t o
s t r a t e g ic c o m p le m e n t a r it y ( s u p e r m o d u la r it y) .
4 M onotone compar ative statics
In t h is s e c t io n we d e ve lo p e c o n o m ic e xp la n a t io n s p e r t a in in g t o o u r fo r e g o in g qu a lit a t ive
o b s e r va t io n s . In t h e fo llo win g , b y d e fa u lt we c o n s id e r t h e m o s t fa m ilia r c a s e s wh e r e t h e
d u o p o lis t s s u p p ly p r o d u c t s wh ic h a r e s u b s t it u t e s p e r c e ive d fr o m t h e d e m a n d s id e .
4.1 Why unadjustability smoothes pr oﬁts
A n u n a d ju s t a b le Co u r n o t o lig o p o lis t u n d e r p r o d u c e s wh e n t h e s t a t e o f d e m a n d a is u n e xp e c t e d ly
h ig h , a n d o ve r p r o d u c e s wh e n t h e s t a t e is lo w. Th r o u g h s t r a t e g ic s u b s t it u t io n , t h is in d u c e s
it s a d ju s t a b le c o m p e t it o r t o e xp a n d in t h e h ig h s t a t e , t o d o wn s iz e in t h e lo w s t a t e . Th e s e
r e a c t io n s d e live r fe e d b a c k e ﬀe c t s t o t h e u n a d ju s t a b le ﬁ r m , s o a s t o r e d u c e t h e p r o ﬁ t o f
t h e u n a d ju s t a b le ﬁ r m in t h e h ig h s t a t e , wh ils t e n h a n c in g it in t h e lo w s t a t e . A lt o g e t h e r ,
t h e s e fe e d b a c k e ﬀe c t s s e r ve t o s m o o t h t h e p r o ﬁ t s o f t h e u n a d ju s t a b le ﬁ r m t h r o u g h o u t
va r io u s s t a t e s o f d e m a n d . A s im ila r e ﬀe c t s h a ll b e p r e s e n t in a B e r t r a n d o lig o p o ly wh e r e
t h e ﬁ r m s s u p p ly d e m a n d c o m p le m e n t s , a n d a ls o in a b r o a d e r c la s s o f g a m e s wit h s t r a t e g ic
s u b s t it u t io n .
1 2On t h e o t h e r h a n d , a n u n a d ju s t a b le B e r t r a n d o lig o p o lis t u n d e r p r ic e s wh e n t h e s t a t e
a is a b o ve a ve r a g e , o ve r p r ic e s wh e n t h e s t a t e is b e lo w a ve r a g e . N o w via s t r a t e g ic c o m p le -
m e n t a r it y ( a s s u m in g a g a in t h a t t h e s e ﬁ r m s s u p p ly d e m a n d s u b s t it u t e s ) , t h is e n c o u r a g e s
it s a d ju s t a b le c o m p e t it o r t o fo llo w, a lb e it t o a le s s e r e xt e n t , t h e u n d e r p r ic in g wh e n t h e
s t a t e is h ig h , a n d a ls o t o fo llo w t h e o ve r p r ic in g wh e n t h e s t a t e is lo w. Fe e d b a c k fr o m
t h e s e r e a c t io n s t o t h e u n a d ju s t a b le ﬁ r m ’s p r o ﬁ t s is t o c u r b t h e la t t e r ’s p r o ﬁ t in t h e h ig h
s t a t e , b u t t o r e s c u e it in t h e lo w s t a t e . A lt o g e t h e r , t h e fe e d b a c k o n c e a g a in h e lp s s m o o t h
t h e u n a d ju s t a b le ﬁ r m ’s p r o ﬁ t s a c r o s s d iﬀe r e n t s t a t e s a. A n a n a lo g o u s e ﬀe c t s h a ll e m e r g e
in a Co u r n o t o lig o p o ly wh e r e t h e ﬁ r m s s u p p ly d e m a n d c o m p le m e n t s , a n d a ls o in a m o r e
g e n e r a l c la s s o f g a m e s wit h s t r a t e g ic c o m p le m e n t a r it y.
4.2 Why pr oﬁts ar e easier to smooth under submodular ity than
under super modular ity
W h e n a n u n a d ju s t a b le Co u r n o t o lig o p o lis t o ve r p r o d u c e s in a r e c e s s io n , it s o u t p u t qu a n t it y
is n a t u r a lly h ig h e r t h a n t h a t b y it s a d ju s t a b le c o m p e t it o r . Th is a ﬀo r d s t h e fo r m e r a
s t r ic t ly h ig h e r p r o ﬁ t a t t h e e xp e n s e o f t h e la t t e r . W h e n t h e u n a d ju s t a b le ﬁ r m u n d e r p r o -
d u c e s in a b o o m , it s c o m p e t it o r c la im s a h ig h e r m a r ke t s h a r e b o t h in qu a n t it ie s a n d t h u s
in p r o ﬁ t s . Ove r a ll, t h e u n a d ju s t a b le ﬁ r m s m o o t h e s it s o wn p r o ﬁ t s a c r o s s t h e s t a t e s , a ll t h e
wh ile m a g n ifyin g it s c o m p e t it o r ’s p r o ﬁ t ﬂ u c t u a t io n s . E ﬀe c t s a r e s im ila r u n d e r s t r a t e g ic
s u b s t it u t io n in g e n e r a l, s u c h a s in a B e r t r a n d g a m e wit h c o m p le m e n t a r y p r o d u c t s .
On t h e o t h e r h a n d , wh e n a n u n a d ju s t a b le B e r t r a n d o lig o p o lis t o ve r p r ic e s in a r e c e s s io n ,
it s p r ic e is h ig h e r t h a n it s a d ju s t a b le c o m p e t it o r ’s p r ic e , t h e la t t e r e a r n in g a h ig h e r p r o ﬁ t
t h a n t h e fo r m e r . In a b o o m , t h e u n a d ju s t a b le ﬁ r m u n d e r p r ic e s a t a p r ic e b e lo w it s
c o m p e t it o r ’s , e a r n in g a h ig h e r p r o ﬁ t t h a n t h e c o m p e t it o r . Th e r e b y t h e u n a d ju s t a b le
ﬁ r m s e r ve s t o s m o o t h it s c o m p e t it o r ’s p r o ﬁ t s m o r e t h a n it s o wn p r o ﬁ t s . W h ils t t h e
u n a d ju s t a b le B e r t r a n d ﬁ r m ’s o wn p r o ﬁ t s a r e s m o o t h e d b y vir t u e o f it s u n a d ju s t a b ilit y,
m o s t o f t h e p r o ﬁ t s m o o t h in g e ﬀe c t s s p ills o ve r t o it s c o m p e t it o r . E ﬀe c t s a r e qu a lit a t ive ly
t h e s a m e u n d e r s t r a t e g ic c o m p le m e n t a r it y in g e n e r a l, in c lu d in g a Co u r n o t g a m e wit h
c o m p le m e n t a r y p r o d u c t s .
4.3 When unadjustability fails to smooth pr oﬁts
N o w, s e e kin g a c o u n t e r -c a s e wh e r e u n a d ju s t a b ilit y fa ils t o s e r ve a s a p r o ﬁ t s m o o t h in g
d e vic e , m a y h e lp u s d e ve lo p a fu r t h e r in s ig h t . A s a t h o u g h t e xp e r im e n t , c o n t e m p la t e a n
u n u s u a l kin d o f d u o p o ly wh e r e t wo a priori s ym m e t r ic a l d u o p o lis t s n e ve r t h e le s s a d o p t
a s ym m e t r ic a l s t r a t e g y s p a c e s , o n e ﬁ r m c h o o s in g it s o u t p u t qu a n t it y wh ils t t h e o t h e r
1 3s e t t in g it s s u p p ly p r ic e . S u p p o s e ﬁ r s t t h a t t h e qu a n t it y-s e t t in g ﬁ r m is u n a d ju s t a b le . If
t h e s t a t e o f d e m a n d is h ig h , t h e s a id u n a d ju s t a b ilit y fo r c e s t h e ﬁ r m t o u n d e r p r o d u c e
r e la t ive t o t h e h ig h d e m a n d , le a vin g a b o u n t ifu l r e s id u a l d e m a n d t h e o t h e r ﬁ r m wh o t h u s
o ve r p r ic e s . Th is fe e d s b a c k t o t h e u n a d ju s t a b le qu a n t it y-s e t t e r a s a p o s it ive c o n t r ib u t o r
t o it s p r o ﬁ t s . In a lo w d e m a n d s t a t e , t h e u n a d ju s t a b le ﬁ r m o ve r p r o d u c e s r e la t ive t o t h e
d e m a n d , wh ic h o p p r e s s e s t h e o t h e r ﬁ r m wh o is t h e n fo r c e d t o u n d e r p r ic e . Th is in t u r n p u t s
t h e qu a n t it y-s e t t e r in a c o m p e t it ive d is a d va n t a g e , h in d e r in g it s p r o ﬁ t s . U n a d ju s t a b ilit y
h e r e b y s e r ve s t o a m p lify t h e vo la t ilit y in t h e ﬁ r m ’s p r o ﬁ t s .
5 Welfar e and socioeconomic implications
Th u s fa r , we h a ve c o n c e n t r a t e d o u r a t t e n t io n o n in c e n t ive s t o b e o r n o t t o b e a d ju s t a b le
fr o m t h e ﬁ r m s ’ p o in t s o f vie w. W e n o w c o m p le t e o u r a n a lys is b y in ve s t ig a t in g t h e s o c ia l
im p lic a t io n s o f ﬁ r m s ’ a d ju s t in g o r n o t a d ju s t in g t o t h e s t a t e o f e c o n o m y.
5.1 Consumer s sur plus and welfar e in the Cour not mar ket
In 2 .3 a n d 2 .4 we h a ve s h o wn t h a t in c e n t ive s t r u c t u r e s fo s t e r in g in s t it u t io n a l r is k a ve r s io n
m a y e n c o u r a g e s o m e , n o t a ll, o f t h e o lig o p o lis t s t o o p t a wa y fr o m a d ju s t a b ilit y.
A n a t u r a l qu e s t io n h e r e is wh e t h e r t h is is g o o d n e ws fo r c o n s u m e r s , a n d u lt im a t e ly
fo r t h e in d u s t r y-wid e t o t a l s u r p lu s .
Lemma v : Th e e xp e c t e d c o n s u m e r s s u r p lu s is h ig h e r wh e n b o t h ﬁ r m s a r e a d ju s t a b le
t h a n wh e n o n ly o n e o f t h e m is , a n d wh e n o n e ﬁ r m is a d ju s t a b le t h a n wh e n n e it h e r
is .
P r oposition 5 : B e t we e n a n y t wo d iﬀe r e n t a d ju s t a b ilit y p r o ﬁ le s , t h e p r o b a b ilit y d is t r i-
b u t io n s o f c o n s u m e r s s u r p lu s e s h a ve n o ﬁ r s t - o r s e c o n d -o r d e r s t o c h a s t ic d o m in a n c e
r e la t io n g u a r a n t e e d fo r a ll d is t r ib u t io n s o f a.
P r oofs fo llo w fr o m e qu ilib r iu m s u p p ly qu a n t it ie s in e a c h a d ju s t a b ilit y p r o ﬁ le c o m p u t e d





























































1 4is e qu a l t o
( 1 + γ) a2
( 2 + γ) 2 in b e n c h m a r k g a m e A A ( in 2 .1 )
4 ( 1 − γ2) + ( γ + ( 2 + γ) a) 2
8 ( 2 + γ) 2 in a s ym m e t r ic g a m e ( in 2 .1 )
1 + γ
( 2 + γ) 2 in b e n c h m a r k g a m e U U ( in 2 .1 )
o f wh ic h t h e m e a n s a r e
( 1 + γ) ( 1 + V a r [a])
( 2 + γ) 2 >
1 + γ
( 2 + γ) 2 +




( 2 + γ) 2
r e s p e c t ive ly, wh ils t t h e r e is n o ﬁ r s t -o r d e r o r e ve n s e c o n d -o r d e r s t o c h a s t ic d o m in a n c e
a m o n g t h e s e t h r e e .
It is n o t e wo r t h y t h a t t h e s e p r o p e r t ie s a r e n o n -s t r a t e g ic . N a m e ly, wh e n a ﬁ r m a d ju s t s it s
p r o d u c t io n , it s u p p lie s a la r g e qu a n t it y wh e n t h e d e m a n d b o o m s , wh ic h e n a b le s a s u r g e in
t h e c o n s u m e r s s u r p lu s . Th is in c r e m e n t o u t we ig h s t h e d e c r e m e n t in t h e c o n s u m e r s s u r p lu s
in c u r r e d b y t h e r e d u c e d p r o d u c t io n wh e n d e m a n d r e c e s s e s . A d ju s t m e n t s in p r o d u c t io n
t h e r e b y e n h a n c e t h e e xp e c t e d c o n s u m e r s s u r p lu s . Th is e ﬀe c t is p r e s e n t wh e t h e r t h e ﬁ r m
is a m o n o p o lis t o r a n o lig o p o lis t .
A n a n a lo g u e a p p lie s t o t h e t o t a l s u r p lu s .
Lemma vi : B o t h ﬁ r m s b e in g a d ju s t a b le e n t a ils a h ig h e r e xp e c t e d t o t a l s u r p lu s t h a n
wh e n o n ly o n e ﬁ r m b e in g a d ju s t a b le , a n d o n e ﬁ r m b e in g a d ju s t a b le t h a n b o t h ﬁ r m s
b e in g u n a d ju s t a b le .
P r oposition 6 : Th e r e is n o we lfa r e r a n kin g in t h e s e n s e o f ﬁ r s t - o r s e c o n d -o r d e r s t o c h a s t ic
d o m in a n c e a m o n g a d ju s t a b ilit y p r o ﬁ le s t h a t h o ld u n ive r s a lly u n d e r a n y d is t r ib u t io n
o f a.
Welfar e implications : A c c o r d in g t o L e m m a t a v a n d vi, a d ju s t a b ilit y e n h a n c e s
e xp e c t e d c o n s u m e r s s u r p lu s a n d we lfa r e . H o we ve r , P r o p o s it io n s 5 a n d 6 c o u n t e r c la im
t h a t , fo r s o m e d is t r ib u t io n o f t h e s t a t e a, ﬁ r m s ’ u n a d ju s t a b ilit y m a y s e r ve t o s t a b ilis e
t h e r e s u lt in g c o n s u m e r s s u r p lu s a n d t o t a l s u r p lu s . Th is im p lie s t h a t if r e p r e s e n t a t ive
c o n s u m e r s a r e r is k a ve r s e , t h e y m a y n o t n e c e s s a r ily wa n t b o t h ﬁ r m s t o b e a d ju s t a b le .
5.2 Consumer s sur plus and welfar e in the B er tr and mar ket
Cu r io u s ly, r e g a r d le s s o f s t r a t e g ic s u b s t it u t io n o r s t r a t e g ic c o m p le m e n t a r it y, qu a lit a t ive
a s s e r t io n s o n t h e Co u r n o t g a m e in L e m m a t a v a n d vi a r e t o b e r e ve r s e d in t h e B e r t r a n d
g a m e , wh ils t P r o p o s it io n s 5 a n d 6 r e m a in in t a c t .
1 5Lemma vii : Th e e xp e c t e d c o n s u m e r s s u r p lu s is h ig h e r wh e n b o t h ﬁ r m s a r e u n a d ju s t a b le
t h a n wh e n o n e ﬁ r m is a d ju s t a b le , a n d wh e n o n ly o n e ﬁ r m is a d ju s t a b le t h a n wh e n
b o t h a r e a d ju s t a b le .
Lemma viii : B o t h ﬁ r m s b e in g u n a d ju s t a b le e n t a ils a h ig h e r e xp e c t e d t o t a l s u r p lu s t h a n
wh e n o n e ﬁ r m b e in g a d ju s t a b le , a n d o n ly o n e ﬁ r m b e in g a d ju s t a b le t h a n b o t h ﬁ r m s
b e in g a d ju s t a b le .
P r oofs fo llo w fr o m e qu ilib r iu m s u p p ly qu a n t it ie s in e a c h a d ju s t a b ilit y p r o ﬁ le c o m p u t e d
in 3 .1 a n d 3 .2 .
Welfar e implications : L e m m a t a vii a n d viii p r o vid e t h a t u n a d ju s t a b ilit y e n h a n c e s
e xp e c t e d c o n s u m e r s s u r p lu s a n d we lfa r e . Th is im p lie s t h a t m a n a g e r ia l r is k a ve r s io n a n d
r e s u lt in g u n a d ju s t a b ilit y in t h e B e r t r a n d ﬁ r m c o n t r ib u t e p o s it ive ly t o t h e t o t a l s u r p lu s in
t h e in d u s t r y.
5.3 Summar y on adjustability and welfar e
Fir m s ’ in c e n t ive s fo r o r a g a in s t a d ju s t in g t h e ir a c t io n s in a c c o r d a n c e wit h t h e s t a t e o f
e c o n o m y is , u n fo r t u n a t e ly, n o t d ir e c t ly lin ke d wit h wh e t h e r t h e a d ju s t m e n t s in qu e s t io n
a r e s o c ia lly d e s ir a b le . Th is m is m a t c h r e ﬂ e c t s t h e fa c t t h a t t h e ir in c e n t ive s a r e s t r a t e g ic
wh ils t we lfa r e im p a c t s o f a d ju s t m e n t s a r e n o t a lwa ys s t r a t e g ic . In fa c t , in o u r o lig o p o ly
e xa m p le s , t h e r e c ip ie n t s o f t h e s e we lfa r e im p a c t s a r e c o n s u m e r s wh o , b y t h e ve r y d e ﬁ n it io n
o f o lig o p o ly, a r e n o t s t r a t e g ic p la ye r s in t h e g a m e t h e o r e t ic s e n s e . Th is c o n t r ib u t e s t o t h e
n o n -s t r a t e g ic n a t u r e o f t h e s e we lfa r e im p a c t s .
6 Concluding r emar ks
A m o n g t h e m o s t p r o m in e n t ly p e r va s ive fe a t u r e s c h a r a c t e r is in g in s t it u t io n a l r ig id it y a n d
m a n a g e r ia l u n a d ju s t a b ilit y, is t h e e xc e s s ive t e n d e n c y t o h e e d p r e c e d e n c e in c o n ju n c t io n
wit h r e la t ive la c k o f r e c e p t ivit y t o wa r d s n e wly e m e r g in g e n vir o n m e n t a l c h a n g e s . Co n s e r -
va t is m in t h is s e n s e m a y a ﬀe c t ﬁ r m b e h a vio u r in a t le a s t t wo wa ys .
On o n e h a n d , it m a ke s t h e ﬁ r m s lo w, o r r e lu c t a n t , in c h a n g in g it s status quo a c t io n s .
S lo w p r o c e s s e s in c o r p o r a t e d e c is io n m a kin g , le n g t h y p r o c e d u r e s fo r a n e w p r o p o s a l t o
o b t a in c o n s e n s u s wit h in t h e ﬁ r m , p r e -e xis t in g a g r e e m e n t s a llo win g lit t le r o o m fo r d is c r e -
t io n a r y ﬂ e xib ilit y, a n d o ve r s iz e d in -ﬁ r m b u r e a u c r a c y, a r e a ll t o o t yp ic a l in c o n s e r va t ive ,
u n e c o n o m ic a l o r g a n is a t io n a l s t r u c t u r e s . In m a in s t r e a m m ic r o e c o n o m ic t h e o r y, t h is a s p e c t
1 6t e n d s t o b e d e a lt wit h b y c o n c e p t u a lis in g a d ju s t m e n t c o s t s r e qu ir e d t o a lt e r t h e ﬁ r m ’s
a c t io n s . S u c h c o s t s m a y we ll b e p r e s e n t a n d s u b s t a n t ia l in t h e c a s e o f m e n u c o s t s , fo r
e xa m p le , wh e r e a n a c t ive a c t io n is r e qu ir e d if a n d o n ly if t h e status quo is t o b e a lt e r e d .
H o we ve r , m a n y o t h e r kin d s o f c o r p o r a t e d e c is io n s a r e e s s e n t ia lly a m a t t e r o f wh e t h e r t o
fo llo w t h e p r e c e d e n t o r n o t . Th e d e c is io n o f p r o d u c t io n qu a n t it y, fo r e xa m p le , m a y n o t b e
s u b s t a n t ia lly c o s t -s a vvy e ve n wh e n r e p lic a t in g wh a t h a p p e n e d in t h e p a s t . In s u c h a c a s e ,
t h e r ig id it y in d e c is io n m a kin g , r a t h e r t h a n t h e a c t u a l t r a n s a c t io n c o s t s , s e e m s t o p la y t h e
c e n t r a l r o le . It is a ls o c o n c e iva b le t h a t t h e s a id in ﬂ e xib ilit y in p r o d u c t io n d e c is io n s m a y
b e le s s like ly t o s e r ve a s a d e vic e t o e s t a b lis h a S t a c ke lb e r g le a d e r s h ip t h a n o t h e r kin d s
o f r ig id it y s u c h a s m e n u c o s t s wh ic h a r e e a s ie r t o ve r ify a n d s u b s t a n t ia t e e xt e r n a lly, e .g .,
fr o m t h e vie wp o in t o f c o m p e t in g e c o n o m ic p la ye r s .
On t h e o t h e r h a n d , c o n s e r va t is m t e n d s t o m a ke t h e m a n a g e m e n t o f t h e ﬁ r m d e fe n -
s ive ly r is k a ve r s e . N a m e ly, in a c o n s e r va t ive s ys t e m , a m a n a g e r t e n d s t o b e p u n is h e d m o r e
h e a vily wh e n t h e ﬁ r m ’s p r o ﬁ t s d e c r e a s e t h a n t o b e r e wa r d e d wh e n t h e p r o ﬁ t s in c r e a s e .
S u c h r e m u n e r a t ive a s ym m e t r y in c it e s m a n a g e r ia l r is k a ve r s io n , wh ic h m a t e r ia lis e s o b s e r -
va t io n a lly a s if t h e ﬁ r m it s e lf we r e a ve r t in g r is k.
In t h is p a p e r we h a ve m o d e lle d a s im p le d u o p o ly g a m e t o e xe m p lify t h a t in s t it u t io n a l
c o n s e r va t is m m a y b e e n d o g e n o u s ly s u s t a in e d in t h e p r e s e n c e o f in t e r -in s t it u t io n a l s t r a t e g ic
in t e r a c t io n s . Th e c e n t r a l ir o n y h e r e is t h a t a n in s t it u t io n m a y b e e n c o u r a g e d t o b e c o m e ,
o r t o r e m a in , c o n s e r va t ive p r e c is e ly b y t h e p r e s e n c e o f a n o n -c o n s e r va t ive c o m p e t it o r . W e
h a ve a ls o o b s e r ve d t h a t s u c h e n d o g e n o u s ly in d u c e d c o n s e r va t is m m a y c o n t r ib u t e e it h e r
p o s it ive ly o r n e g a t ive ly t o we lfa r e , a n d t h a t it is n o t a lwa ys like ly t o e n t a il t h e b e s t
we lfa r e -e ﬃ c ie n t o u t c o m e .
Appendix
N u m e r ic a l t a b le s p e r t a in in g t o o u r Co u r n o t a n d B e r t r a n d d u o p o ly e xa m p le s in s e c t io n s
2 a n d 3 , r e s p e c t ive ly, a r e t a xo n o m ic a lly la id o u t o n t h e fo llo win g t wo p a g e s .
1 7T able 1 : Co u r n o t ﬁ r m s s u p p lyin g s u b s t it u t a b le p r o d u c t s .
γ 0 .3 0 .˙ 3 0 .5 0 .˙ 6 1
πAA[0 .9 5 ] 0 .1 7 0 6 0 4 ··· 0 .1 6 5 7 6 5 ··· 0 .1 4 4 4 ˙ 7 0 .1 2 6 9 1 4 ··· 0 .1 0 0 2 ˙ 7
πAA[1 .0 5 ] 0 .2 0 8 4 1 2 ··· 0 .2 0 2 5 0 .1 7 6 4 0 .1 5 5 0 3 9 ··· 0 .1 2 2 5
πAA[1 .0 5 ]
πAA[0 .9 5 ]
0 .8 1 8 5 9 4 ··· 0 .8 1 8 5 9 4 ··· 0 .8 1 8 5 9 4 ··· 0 .8 1 8 5 9 4 ··· 0 .8 1 8 5 9 4 ···
πUA[0 .9 5 ] 0 .1 7 0 5 5 7 ··· 0 .1 6 5 8 1 6 ··· 0 .1 4 5 0 .1 2 8 1 2 5 0 .1 0 2 ˙ 7
πUA[1 .0 5 ] 0 .2 0 7 5 1 4 ··· 0 .2 0 1 5 3 0 ··· 0 .1 7 5 0 .1 5 3 1 2 5 0 .1 1 9 ˙ 4
πUA[1 .0 5 ]
πUA[0 .9 5 ]
0 .8 2 1 9 0 8 ··· 0 .8 2 2 7 8 4 ··· 0 .8 ˙ 2 8 5 7 1 ˙ 4 0 .8 3 6 7 3 4 ··· 0 .8 6 0 4 6 5 ···
πUA[1 .0 5 ] − πUA[0 .9 5 ]
πAA[1 .0 5 ] − πAA[0 .9 5 ]
0 .9 7 7 5 0 .9 7 ˙ 2 0 .9 3 7 5 0 .˙ 8 0 .7 5
πAU[0 .9 5 ] 0 .1 6 7 9 2 1 ··· 0 .1 6 2 8 6 9 ··· 0 .1 4 0 6 2 5 0 .1 2 2 5 0 .0 9 5 0 6 9 ˙ 4
πAU[1 .0 5 ] 0 .2 1 1 4 0 0 ··· 0 .2 0 5 7 2 7 ··· 0 .1 8 0 6 2 5 0 .1 6 0 .1 2 8 4 0 2 ˙ 7
πAU[1 .0 5 ]
πAU[0 .9 5 ]
0 .7 9 4 3 3 1 ··· 0 .7 9 1 6 7 9 ··· 0 .7 7 8 5 4 6 ··· 0 .7 6 5 6 2 5 0 .7 4 0 4 0 0 ···
πAU[1 .0 5 ] − πAU[0 .9 5 ]
πAA[1 .0 5 ] − πAA[0 .9 5 ]
1 .1 5 1 .1 ˙ 6 1 .2 5 1 .˙ 3 1 .5
πUU[0 .9 5 ] 0 .1 6 7 2 9 6 ··· 0 .1 6 2 2 4 4 ··· 0 .1 4 0 .1 2 1 8 7 5 0 .0 9 ˙ 4
πUU[1 .0 5 ] 0 .2 1 0 7 7 5 ··· 0 .2 0 5 1 0 2 ··· 0 .1 8 0 .1 5 9 3 7 5 0 .1 2 ˙ 7
T able 2 : Co u r n o t ﬁ r m s s u p p lyin g c o m p le m e n t a r y p r o d u c t s .
γ 0 −0 .3 −0 .˙ 3 −0 .5 −0 .˙ 6
πAA[0 .9 5 ] 0 .2 2 5 6 2 5 0 .3 1 2 2 8 3 ··· 0 .3 2 4 9 0 .4 0 ˙ 1 0 .5 0 7 6 5 6 2 5
πAA[1 .0 5 ] 0 .2 7 5 6 2 5 0 .3 8 1 4 8 7 8 8 9 ··· 0 .3 9 6 9 0 .4 9 0 .6 2 0 1 5 6 2 5
πAA[1 .0 5 ]
πAA[0 .9 5 ]
0 .8 1 8 5 9 4 ··· 0 .8 1 8 5 9 4 ··· 0 .8 1 8 5 9 4 ··· 0 .8 1 8 5 9 4 ··· 0 .8 1 8 5 9 4 ···
πUA[0 .9 5 ] 0 .2 2 5 0 .3 1 2 1 9 7 ··· 0 .3 2 5 0 .4 0 2 ˙ 7 0 .5 1 2 5
πUA[1 .0 5 ] 0 .2 7 5 0 .3 7 9 8 4 4 ··· 0 .3 9 5 0 .4 8 6 ˙ 1 0 .6 1 2 5
πUA[1 .0 5 ]
πUA[0 .9 5 ]
0 .˙ 8 ˙ 1 0 .8 2 1 9 0 8 ··· 0 .8 2 2 7 8 4 ··· 0 .8 ˙ 2 8 5 7 1 ˙ 4 0 .8 3 6 7 3 4 ···
πUA[1 .0 5 ] − πUA[0 .9 5 ]
πAA[1 .0 5 ] − πAA[0 .9 5 ]
1 0 .9 7 7 5 0 .9 7 ˙ 2 0 .9 3 7 5 0 .˙ 8
πAU[0 .9 5 ] 0 .2 2 5 6 2 5 0 .3 1 7 2 3 3 ··· 0 .3 3 0 6 2 5 0 .4 1 1 7 3 6 ˙ 1 0 .5 2 5 6 2 5
πAU[1 .0 5 ] 0 .2 7 5 6 2 5 0 .3 7 6 0 5 7 ··· 0 .3 9 0 6 2 5 0 .4 7 8 4 0 2 ˙ 7 0 .6 0 0 6 2 5
πAU[1 .0 5 ]
πAU[0 .9 5 ]
0 .8 1 8 5 9 4 ··· 0 .8 4 3 5 7 8 ··· 0 .8 4 6 4 0 .8 4 0 6 4 7 ··· 0 .8 7 5 1 3 0 ···
πAU[1 .0 5 ] − πAU[0 .9 5 ]
πAA[1 .0 5 ] − πAA[0 .9 5 ]
1 0 .8 5 0 .8 ˙ 3 0 .7 5 0 .˙ 6
πUU[0 .9 5 ] 0 .2 2 5 0 .3 1 6 6 0 8 ··· 0 .3 3 0 .4 ˙ 1 0 .5 2 5
πUU[1 .0 5 ] 0 .2 7 5 0 .3 7 5 4 3 2 ··· 0 .3 9 0 .4 ˙ 7 0 .6
1 8T able 3 : B e r t r a n d ﬁ r m s s u p p lyin g s u b s t it u t a b le p r o d u c t s .
γ 0 0 .3 0 .˙ 3 0 .5 0 .˙ 6
yaa[0 .9 5 ] 0 .2 2 5 6 2 5 0 .1 6 8 1 5 2 ··· 0 .1 6 2 4 5 0 .1 3 ˙ 3 7 ˙ 0 0 .1 0 1 5 3 1 2 5
yaa[1 .0 5 ] 0 .2 7 5 6 2 5 0 .2 0 5 4 1 6 ··· 0 .1 9 8 4 5 0 .1 6 ˙ 3 0 .1 2 4 0 3 1 2 5
yaa[0 .9 5 ]
yaa[1 .0 5 ]
0 .8 1 8 5 9 4 ··· 0 .8 1 8 5 9 4 ··· 0 .8 1 8 5 9 4 ··· 0 .8 1 8 5 9 4 ··· 0 .8 1 8 5 9 4 ···
yua[0 .9 5 ] 0 .2 2 5 0 .1 6 8 1 0 6 ··· 0 .1 6 2 5 0 .1 3 4 ˙ 2 5 ˙ 9 0 .1 0 2 5
yua[1 .0 5 ] 0 .2 7 5 0 .2 0 4 5 3 1 ··· 0 .1 9 7 5 0 .1 6 2 ˙ 0 3 ˙ 7 0 .1 2 2 5
yua[0 .9 5 ]
yua[1 .0 5 ]
0 .˙ 8 ˙ 1 0 .8 2 1 9 0 8 ··· 0 .8 2 2 7 8 4 ··· 0 .8 ˙ 2 8 5 7 1 ˙ 4 0 .8 3 6 7 3 4 ···
yua[1 .0 5 ] − yua[0 .9 5 ]
yaa[1 .0 5 ] − yaa[0 .9 5 ]
1 0 .9 7 7 5 0 .9 7 ˙ 2 0 .9 3 7 5 0 .˙ 8
yau[0 .9 5 ] 0 .2 2 5 6 2 5 0 .1 7 0 8 1 8 ··· 0 .1 6 5 3 1 2 5 0 .1 3 7 2 4 5 ˙ 3 7 ˙ 0 0 .1 0 5 1 2 5
yau[1 .0 5 ] 0 .2 7 5 6 2 5 0 .2 0 2 4 9 2 ··· 0 .1 9 5 3 1 2 5 0 .1 5 9 4 6 7 ˙ 5 9 ˙ 2 0 .1 2 0 1 2 5
yau[0 .9 5 ]
yau[1 .0 5 ]
0 .8 1 8 5 9 4 ··· 0 .8 4 3 5 7 8 ··· 0 .8 4 6 4 0 .8 4 0 6 4 7 ··· 0 .8 7 5 1 3 0 ···
yau[1 .0 5 ] − yau[0 .9 5 ]
yaa[1 .0 5 ] − yaa[0 .9 5 ]
1 0 .8 5 0 .8 ˙ 3 0 .7 5 0 .˙ 6
yuu[0 .9 5 ] 0 .2 2 5 0 .1 7 0 4 8 1 ··· 0 .1 6 5 0 .1 ˙ 3 7 ˙ 0 0 .1 0 5
yuu[1 .0 5 ] 0 .2 7 5 0 .2 0 2 1 5 5 ··· 0 .1 9 5 0 .1 ˙ 5 9 ˙ 2 0 .1 2
T able 4 : B e r t r a n d ﬁ r m s s u p p lyin g c o m p le m e n t a r y p r o d u c t s .
γ −0 .3 −0 .˙ 3 −0 .5 −0 .˙ 6 ε − 1
yaa[0 .9 5 ] 0 .3 1 6 8 3 7 ··· 0 .3 3 1 5 3 0 ··· 0 .4 3 3 2 0 .6 3 4 5 7 0 ··· 0 .2 0 0 ˙ 5 /ε
yaa[1 .0 5 ] 0 .3 8 7 0 5 1 ··· 0 .4 0 5 0 .5 2 9 2 0 .7 7 5 1 9 5 ··· 0 .2 4 5 /ε
yaa[0 .9 5 ]
yaa[1 .0 5 ]
0 .8 1 8 5 9 4 ··· 0 .8 1 8 5 9 4 ··· 0 .8 1 8 5 9 4 ··· 0 .8 1 8 5 9 4 ··· 0 .8 1 8 5 9 4 ···
yua[0 .9 5 ] 0 .3 1 6 7 4 9 ··· 0 .3 3 1 6 3 2 ··· 0 .4 3 5 0 .6 4 0 6 2 5 0 .2 0 ˙ 5 /ε
yua[1 .0 5 ] 0 .3 8 5 3 8 3 ··· 0 .4 0 3 0 6 1 ··· 0 .5 2 5 0 .7 6 5 6 2 5 0 .2 3 ˙ 8 /ε
yua[0 .9 5 ]
yua[1 .0 5 ]
0 .8 2 1 9 0 8 ··· 0 .8 2 2 7 8 4 ··· 0 .8 ˙ 2 8 5 7 1 ˙ 4 0 .8 3 6 7 3 4 ··· 0 .8 6 0 4 6 5 ···
yua[1 .0 5 ] − yua[0 .9 5 ]
yaa[1 .0 5 ] − yaa[0 .9 5 ]
0 .9 7 7 5 0 .9 7 ˙ 2 0 .9 3 7 5 0 .˙ 8 0 .7 5
yau[0 .9 5 ] 0 .3 1 1 8 5 4 ··· 0 .3 2 5 7 3 9 ··· 0 .4 2 1 8 7 5 0 .6 1 2 5 0 .1 9 0 1 2 5 /ε
yau[1 .0 5 ] 0 .3 9 2 6 0 0 ··· 0 .4 1 1 4 5 4 ··· 0 .5 4 1 8 7 5 0 .8 0 .2 5 6 7 2 5 /ε
yau[0 .9 5 ]
yau[1 .0 5 ]
0 .7 9 4 3 3 1 ··· 0 .7 9 1 6 7 9 ··· 0 .7 7 8 5 4 6 ··· 0 .7 6 5 6 2 5 0 .7 4 0 4 0 0 ···
yau[1 .0 5 ] − yau[0 .9 5 ]
yaa[1 .0 5 ] − yaa[0 .9 5 ]
1 .1 5 1 .1 ˙ 6 1 .2 5 1 .˙ 3 1 .5
yuu[0 .9 5 ] 0 .3 1 0 6 9 4 ··· 0 .3 2 4 4 8 9 ··· 0 .4 2 0 .6 0 9 3 7 5 0 .1 ˙ 8 /ε
yuu[1 .0 5 ] 0 .3 9 1 4 3 9 ··· 0 .4 1 0 2 0 4 ··· 0 .5 4 0 .7 9 6 8 7 5 0 .2 ˙ 4 /ε
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